ABSTRACT. We analyze farmland prices in the Ger
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by a simple but not trivial question: What is a reasonable mortgage lending value for agricultural land? It is essential for creditors to know this value when offering loans to farmers, since the mortgage lending value constitutes an upper limit for a loan. The idea behind this premise is that the mortgaged land can be sold at any time within the loan contract period, at least at the mortgaged lending value in the event of a loan default. A starting point for deriving the mortgage lending value is the sale value (liquidation value) of land, which will generally deviate from bookkeeping values. The mortgage lending value, however, is usually smaller than the current sales value. There are at least two reasons to justify this price-shaving: first, the future sale value in the contract period is not exactly predictable, and thus a risk-averse lender will discount the current sales value as a precautionary measure. Second, in the event of a credit default, the liquidation of the mortgaged land will be a forced sale that takes place within a bankruptcy proceeding. It is frequently supposed that realized prices in forced sales are lower compared to "normal" land market transactions, where sellers are not under financial stress (e.g., Allen and Swisher 2000) . In this paper we focus on the second argument; that is, we want to explore if there is really a price discount in forced sales and if so, how large it is.
Three strands of literature are relevant for our research question. The first one deals with the pricing of farmland. The objective of this strand is to identify factors that determine the level of land prices. Knowledge of these factors is helpful for understanding price differentials in cross-sectional data. This kind of analysis is usually conducted in a hedonic pricing framework (cf. Palmquist and Danielson 1989) . Huang et al. (2006) classify factors that are commonly used in hedonic studies on land prices into four groups: productivity, neighborhood, location, and environmental characteristics. Almost all empirical studies on farmland values include a measure of soil quality and parcel size to capture productive capacity (e.g., Xu, Mittelhammer, and Barkley 1993) . Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) focus on the effect of climatic variables on farmland values. For example, population density and per capita income are frequently used to represent nonfarm factors and competing potential land uses. Locations' characteristics are, for example, distance to large cities; and environmental variables may refer to swine farm density or the number of biogas plants in a region (cf. Breustedt and Habermann 2010) . Moreover, almost all recent hedonic studies on land prices find that land prices are spatially correlated. That is, prices do, ceteris paribus, depend on neigh-borhood prices and market conditions. Among others, Patton and McErlean (2003) emphasize the necessity of properly dealing with spatial effects.
The second strand of literature discusses the impact of forced or pressured sales on asset prices. It is generally argued that knowledge about a current owner who urgently needs to dispose of an asset for liquidity or health reasons leads to a price discount compared to unpressured sales (Allen and Swisher 2000) . The decisive point here is that the asset market may face a temporal and/or regional illiquidity, meaning that additional supply lowers the market clearing price. The effect is less pronounced in a booming market that is short in supply. Empirical evidence for the conjecture is provided by Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) for the U.S. housing market. Other factors like the information policy (e.g., announcement of the sale) may lead to price discounts as well. Mitchell, Malpezzi, and Green (2009) note that forced sales are often badly advertised, and potential buyers are less informed about the characteristics of the object compared with voluntary sales. This lack of information may lead to conservative bids. Further reasons for price discounts are vandalism or protection costs, as long as houses are vacant. These reasons, however, are specific to the housing market and do not apply to the land market, where land does not usually fall idle before a forced sale. Analyses of pressured land sales in agriculture are rare. An exception is that of King and Sinden (1994) , who surprisingly find no significant price discount in the Australian land market.
The third strand of literature analyzes the role of the respective market mechanism in price formation. This literature is relevant here because pressured sales are usually carried out in the framework of an auction. Therefore, it is necessary to disentangle two effects when analyzing empirical price data: first, the impact of time and liquidity constraints of the seller, and second, the influence of the market mechanism. The latter aspect has been discussed in the auction literature, both theoretically and empirically. Lusht (1996) compares house prices realized in (English) auctions with prices that came out in private negotiations: he finds that prices brought out on auctions were about 8% higher compared with private house sales. This finding is questioned by Mayer (1995 Mayer ( , 1998 , who argues that if auctioned assets sell at higher prices than in search markets, both market mechanisms could not coexist because auctions also allow one to sell the asset sooner. Thus, sellers were always better off using auctions. Using data from real estate auctions in the United States, Mayer finds price discounts for auctioned properties. These price discounts, however, are not constant over time. Rather, price discounts on auctions are relatively large in downturn markets, and they almost vanish in booming markets. Significant price discounts on auctions are also reported by Allen and Swisher (2000) . However, Quan (2002) offers a theoretical explanation for why auctions could offer price premiums relative to search markets: he derives a partial equilibrium model where buyers and sellers can choose between an auction and a search market as a mechanism for real estate disposition. In equilibrium it is optimal for buyers incurring high search costs to attend an auction instead of participating in the search market. Due to this self-selection, buyers are willing to pay higher prices at auctions.
To sum up, there is no clear prediction on the size and the sign of a price discount/premium for enforced land sales from auctions. While it is undisputed that pressured sales will result in lower prices, this effect might be (over)compensated for by using auctions as a market mechanism. In any case, we expect price discounts to be lower in prospering market conditions.
In this article we empirically quantify the price effects of foreclosures. We analyze land price data in the federal state of Brandenburg, Germany, that have been realized in forced sales from 2000 to 2011, and compare them with prices of unforced sales in that state. A direct comparison of these two groups and the identification of a forced-sales effect is challenging for several reasons. First, land characteristics vary between the sold land plots, and one must control for these differences carefully. That means there might exist a selectivity problem such that land being sold in foreclosure auctions differs systematically from land in a control group. Thus, we have to create a proper counterfactual. Second, the land market in East Germany has evolved dynamically over the last decade, showing high rates of price increase. This development may cover a price discount of forced sales. As argued above, price discounts (if any) are expected to be smaller in a booming land market. Hence, an empirical study should allow the price effect of a foreclosure to vary over time. We apply a treatment model that accounts for these problems, and compare different estimation approaches.
II. FORCED SALES IN THE FEDERAL STATE OF BRANDENBURG Legal Framework of Forced Sales in Germany
In Germany, the forced sale, or foreclosure, is a tool for creditors (e.g., banks) to dispose of loan securities whose debtors (e.g., farms) have defaulted on their debt service. Here, we focus on debtors who mortgaged their arable land. We start by describing the peculiarities of foreclosures that may lead to price differences compared with the regular land market.
The first substantial characteristic of a forced sale is the motivation of this transaction. In contrast to a regular land market, the seller acts involuntarily. This peculiarity and the fact that is public knowledge may weaken the bargaining position of the seller and result in a price discount. Furthermore, the purpose of announcing a foreclosure is not to attract many potential buyers, but rather to comply with legal requirements. The given information is bound to the identification number of the land plot, the date of the auction, the size of the plot, a reference value, and sometimes information about soil quality. Regular land sales advertisements, however, provide additional information, for instance, the accessibility of the parcel or the rental status. Moreover, the advertisement of forced sales is usually done in a perfunctory manner. The advertisements often appear exclusively in unfamiliar newspapers and specialized web pages that are appointed by the responsible court, while regular market sales are advertised in several expert magazines as well as regional newspapers. The poor advertisement thus leads the reasonable bidder to submit a conservative bid due to uncertainty (Mitchell, Malpezzi, and Green 2009 ).
An additional barrier for prospective buyers is a deposit required to participate in a compulsory auction. The amount of the deposit is 10% of the property's market value, which is determined by real estate experts. The highest bidder is obliged to pay the total sum in six to eight weeks, while the deposit remains with the seller. The necessity of prefinancing a certain amount of solvency may preclude further potential purchasers.
Important parameters in a forced-sale process are the calculation of the regular market price, the minimum bid, the auction date, the date of the bid's acceptance, and the date of the transfer of ownership. Stakeholders of a forced-sale process are the court-appointed appraiser, the judicial officer, the creditor, and his estate agent (Kolkmann 2010) . Calculating the open market price is the appraiser's responsibility. This price is highly relevant because the expected price of the bidders and creditors aligns to the open market price estimation of the expert. The minimum bid marks the starting value of a forced-sale auction and takes into account costs of the foreclosure, as well as permanent rights of third persons to the farmland (e.g., the rights of way). The judicial officer guides the whole forced-sale process, but his principal duty is to execute the auction. Besides this obligation, the judicial officer is responsible for the timing of the foreclosure, including the length of the period between the scheduling and appointment of the auction. 1 Furthermore, the judicial officer has a social charge, which means he must ensure a fair process for all participants. In most cases there is more than one creditor, but often the principal creditor is a bank because banks normally have the largest amount of outstanding accounts.
The Land Market in Brandenburg, East Germany
The German land market is heterogeneous in several ways. Even more than 20 years after reunification, considerable differences persist between the new (Eastern) and the old (Western) federal states of Germany. Here, we focus on the federal state of Brandenburg, which can be considered as a representative example for the evolving East German farmland market. The land price data for Brandenburg are provided by the Oberer Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte im Land Brandenburg. 2 In what follows we briefly describe the land market in Brandenburg.
In general, agricultural land becomes available in the land market only if farmers cease production and sell or lease out their land. In Germany, such land sales are usually carried out through private negotiations or smaller nonpublic auctions. In regions (and countries) with a history of land collectivization where land is being privatized, private farms may have the additional possibility to buy or rent previously state-owned land. Accordingly, Brandenburg's land market is further strongly influenced by the expropriation and land collectivization that took place between 1945 and 1989. After German reunification, the Treuhand agency (or Treuhandanstalt) was founded to privatize the formerly state-owned land in the new federal states. Today, the successor of the Treuhand, the Bodenverwertungs-und -verwaltungsgesellschaft (BVVG), is the main organization responsible for privatizing on behalf of the German government. In 2011, the total number of land transactions was 14,900 in the new federal states (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011), of which roughly 5,000 were carried out by the BVVG (BVVG 2011) . The share of the total traded area of the BVVG is approximately 60%, while in Brandenburg the share amounts to 58%. Today in Brandenburg, roughly 95,600 ha 3 of farmland (including all types of farmland) are still to be privatized within the coming years (BVVG 2011) . The BVVG sells the land, usually through first-price sealed bid auctions with public tendering. Anybody can submit a bid, and the land is sold to the bidder with the highest bid (or to the current tenant if he has a preemption right and wants to buy the land for a price equal to the highest bid). It should be noted that the transaction needs to conform to the law of land transactions (German: Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz), where, for instance, the legal basis is that agricultural land should be used as such.
Compulsory auctions like the ones we analyze typically play only a minor role in the agricultural land market because they require both the insolvency of a farmer and that the land not be sold before the insolvency process begins. From 2005 to 2010 in Germany, the number of such cases varied between 400 and 600 each year (BMELV 2010) . A further particularity of the German land market is the so-called preemption right of specific public institutions (Landgesellschaft or Landsiedlungsgesellschaft at the federal state level). This right can be applied in cases that would cause an "unhealthy" distribution of land or an unreasonable parceling. A further reason is given when the sale price for the land is largely disproportionate to its real value. This could be either a too small or a too high price given the conditions of the land and the local land prices for comparable lots. The right is usually employed if at least one active farm with the willingness to grow signals a strong interest for the land but the buyer is not related to the local agricultural businesses. In practice, however, this rarely happens. The total number for Germany in 2011 amounted to 241 cases (Goetz 2012) .
The dataset contains information about land prices, soil quality (measured in terms of an index 4 for arable and grassland), the re- spective plot sizes, the date of sale, and whether the plot was sold through a foreclosure procedure. The control group contains all land transactions other than within a foreclosure, such as the usual market sales carried through either a nonpublic auction or negotiations, and also sales from auctions within the privatization process. This implies that in both groups, prices from auctions are observed since it is unfortunately not possible to identify the BVVG land sales in the data. As a consequence, we cannot explicitly identify the effect of the public auction itself.
The original data were modified after receipt from the institution providing the data: so-called uncommon/unusual sales have been removed, as has land expected to be converted to residential land. By law 5 unusual sales are defined as transactions that achieve extraordinarily high or low prices and transactions between relatives. This left us with 58,463 observations, of which 752 were forced sales, representing a total traded area of 324,145 ha. More than half of the remaining observations higher the soil quality index is, the higher is the potential yield and quality. Originally, the highest quality was designated with a value of 100. Recently, the highest value that has been measured is 102.
5 §7 of the German regulation on the determination of property values (German: Immobilienwertermittlungsverordnung).
had to be removed due to missing information about soil quality. Furthermore, we eliminated observations that were sold at a price of exactly €1.00/m 2 , since these observations can be assigned to highway compensation procedures (i.e., farmers who are forced to sell their land due to highway construction and receive a fixed compensation in return).
In this analysis we consider only plots that contain arable land, that is, purely arable land plots and mixed plots that consist of arable land and grassland (these can be identified through positive values for arable soil quality points and grassland points). We exclude pure grassland plots (7,752 observations, of which 85 were forced-sales observations) because the price formation for grassland or pasture land is likely different. However, we decided not to exclude mixed plots, since otherwise the number of forced sales would have been too small (84 forced sales of mixed plots). Finally, we were left with 19,234 observations, of which 211 were forced sales with a traded area volume of 118,526 ha from January 2000 to September 2011. This makes up a share of about 46.5% of the original observations, and 36.5% of the area sold during that period.
The farmland prices in Brandenburg as given by the data show a rather dynamic evolution; they increased rapidly over the last 5 years, as shown in Figure 1 . The prices of the forced sales seem to be more volatile compared to nonforced sales, and from 2006 onward they start to increase sharply. In more recent years, the forced-sales prices are considerably higher compared to nonforced sales. This provides a first impression of the price differences between forced and unforced sales; it seems that there is no overall price discount on forced sales. Both groups, however, may differ in price-relevant factors besides the date of sale, so a direct comparison may be misleading. Note that forced sales occurred later over time, on average, than did the nonforced sales, and thus they may be driven by the general market price increase in Germany since 2006. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the crucial farmland characteristics for the nonforced-and forced-sales (treatment) groups. The mean price of forced sales is higher; however, it also shows a higher standard deviation. Soil quality does not differ much between the groups, and the average plot size is higher in the nonforced-sales group, which may have a price-increasing effect on the farmland price (e.g., Maddison 2000) . Figure 2 shows average prices from 2008 to 2010 for each county 6 in the federal state of Brandenburg on the left-hand side; on the right-hand side the average soil quality points by county are illustrated. Evidently, higher land prices go along with a higher soil quality index like in the northeast of Brandenburg. Also, farmland plots with rather low prices are concentrated and form low-price regions, for instance in the southeast. Very likely the land prices are spatially correlated; that is, prices show a dependency on the neighborhood, in particular on land prices for comparable lots. This is often reported in previous studies on hedonic land pricing (e.g., Paterson and Boyle 2002; Pace et al. 1998 ). In the analysis we control for soil quality, and we additionally refer to county dummies to capture further unobserved regional effects. Since no spatial coordinates of the land plots are available in the data and the lowest regional level information is the county, we do not apply spatial econometric techniques and refer to the county information by means of dummy variables.
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
We aim to quantify the effect of a forced auction sale procedure on farmland per-hectare prices. Based on the literature review, we conjecture that two effects are present when analyzing forced sales in Brandenburg. First, the public tender ensures market transparency and thereby increases the number of potential bidders. This may induce a positive price effect. Second, the procedure of a forced sale under time pressure may induce a negative effect. A simple comparison of mean prices of forced sales and unforced sales would neglect possible differences in the land characteristics such as soil quality and plot size. Instead, we apply a treatment model to estimate the effect of a foreclosure on land prices. After a brief introduction of the general framework, we describe two alternative ways of estimating the treatment effect, namely, a regression model and a matching procedure. Since matching and regression techniques have different strengths and weaknesses, we implement both procedures and compare the results. 7
Modeling the Treatment Effect
Referring to the so-called Rubin causal model (Rubin 1974 (Rubin , 1977 , we define an indicator variable for a treatment (forced 
We aim to measure the average price (dis)advantage of a forced sale as a consequence of selling the land within a foreclosure procedure rather than selling it on the private land market; that is, the expected value is taken over all land plots that actually have received a treatment. Alternatively, we could ask what the price would have been if the land had not been sold within a foreclosure. This refers to the average treatment effect of the treated (ATET). Based on the above definitions, this value is given by 1 0
[1]
In addition, the average treatment effect (ATE) takes the average of the price difference for all observations regardless of the treatment status and provides the average effect of a forced sale for a typical lot in Brandenburg. The effects differ if the treatment effect is not constant over the subjects and depends on, for instance, regional conditions that are unobserved and thus not considered in the set of conditioning variables in the conditional independence assumption (CIA) (cf., among others, Heckman and Vytlacil 2000) . Since banks are more concerned about the price effect of lots that have to be sold within a foreclosure, and our dataset provides asymmetries in the sample size of the control and the treatment group, we confined our analysis to the ATET. 8 Since the counterfactual can-
not be observed, we need to find substitutes from the control group and estimate them. This introduces a potential bias into the estimation of treatment effects. According to Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) , this bias can be decomposed into (1) failure to compare treated and untreated cases at common values of conditioning variables; (2) failure to weight the two groups comparably; and (3) the selectivity bias. These authors show that, in general, the first two sources of the evaluation bias are more relevant than the selectivity bias. The latter emerges if the CIA is violated. The CIA requires that after controlling for price characteristics (summarized in matrix ), the price differential is due to the x treatment only. More formally, the CIA asserts that , and thus = 0 0
and Pischke 2009). That is, conditional on price-determining variables like soil quality, plot size, and date of sale, the comparison of prices between the treatment group and the control group is unbiased. Due to limited information in the dataset, we cannot rule out the existence of a selectivity bias arising from omitting factors that are price relevant, for instance, the number and the location of land plots. However, the main determinants for the treatment assignment (e.g., characteristics of the initial land owner) are different from the main price determinants (e.g., soil quality). Thus, we expect the resulting selectivity bias to be low. 9
Here we refer to two alternative ways to estimate the counterfactual price 0 E[p ⎪x,d matching does not hinge on such an assumption. Regression allows us to extrapolate a functional form so that it is rather easy to estimate a counterfactual; however, extrapolation based on assumptions on functional forms may be misleading. To grasp this idea the ATETs based on both approaches are compared.
ATET Using Price Regressions
We presume different pricing mechanisms for the markets: forced sales versus sales carried out under "regular" market conditions. This in turn leads to differing relations between the price of the lot and its price-determining characteristics expressed through different hedonic price regressions. In other words, the respective slope coefficients are affected by the treatment, and a linear additive effect of a forced sale is ruled out (as it would be estimated by adding a dummy variable indicating the treatment to the regression equation). Ideally, we would estimate a price regression for each group in a system of equations. As an alternative, a so-called fully interacted model could be estimated. That is, each explanatory variable would be multiplied with the treatment dummy to account for the difference in the slope coefficients by treatment. However, the unequal number of observations between the groups and the low number of observations in the forced-sales group prevented us from estimating a price function for each group, since doing so may lead to identification problems. Thus, we proceed as follows: In a first step, we estimate a price function for the control group and use the estimates to predict a hypothetical perhectare price using the forced-sales observations. The regression equation is defined as 0 0 0 0
j j j where denotes the jth row (observation) of 0 x j the matrix of covariates containing soil quality and plot size, as well as regional county (Landkreis) and year dummies. Symbol de-0 u j notes the error term, which is assumed to have a zero mean and be uncorrelated with the covariates. The hypothetical price of the forced sales under nonforced conditions is derived using the predicted values of the treated observations, but using the estimated coefficients from the price regression derived 0 β based on equation [2] :
[3]
The ATET is derived as the difference between the realized price and the predicted hypothetical price:
The final regression model specification is based on Box-Cox 10 testing results and given by where denotes the county dummy variable l D with l indexing the respective 18 counties in Brandenburg. These counties were considered 10 Details of this procedure can, for instance, be found in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) . The Box-Cox results show a transformation parameter for the left-hand side variable (land price) of about 0.15 (significant at the 1% level). Referring to Osborne (2010), we opt for the log transformation of the price variable since the estimate of the transformation coefficient is close to zero. The parameter for the right-hand side variables except the dummy variables is about 2.37 (significant at the 1% level), and thus we additionally use the squared versions of the variables but scale them using the logarithmic form. This choice is further supported by conventional evaluation criteria such as the Bayesian information criterion. The pragmatic approach is further supported by the fact that spatial correlation cannot be excluded (neither can it be considered), and according to Baltagi and Li (2004) . Since all observa-γ year,t tions from the control group are used for the estimation, and we account for time through dummy variables only; the treatment effect is derived by using coefficients that are estimated using all observations, but the yearly treatment effect on the treated is then only taken by averaging out the annual observations.
The predicted hypothetical prices for the forced-sales observations refer to an out-of sample prediction. The worse the prediction is, that is, the larger difference between the observed forced-sale price and the predicted hypothetical price, the more likely is a significant ATET. We refer to a one-sample t-test and to Pearson's chi-square test in order to test the significance of the price differential.
Our approach is in a wider sense comparable to a regression with a multiplicative dummy variable indicating the treatment of being a forced sale. In this case, all coefficients would be affected by the treatment. That is, they would change by treatment, but all at the same rate given by the estimated coefficient for the treatment dummy variable. The proposed procedure here allows us to account for a more complex treatment effect in the hedonic price regression.
ATET Using Matching
For each observation in the treatment group, matching approaches choose observa-tions with similar characteristics from the control group to estimate a counterfactual price. Similarity is often measured by propensity scores, that is, the probability of being treated (e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . We do not apply propensity score matching, since we do not have any information about the previous land owners, which is important for explaining the probability of being forced to sell land within a foreclosure. As a result, the correlation between the covariates and the treatment is low. Instead, we implement covariate matching and use the (one-dimensional) Mahalanobis distance as a measure for similarity between the land lots (and a dimension reduction tool). The advantage of this approach is that correlation between covariates and different scaling is taken into account (Rubin 1980) . Another advantage is its straightforward implementation. 12 The Mahalanobis distance between observation i and j is defined as = M ij ( , where i indexes the x j noting the jth row of the matrix of covariates for the nontreated observations. The Mahalanobis metric is calculated with regular priceinfluencing factors like soil quality, lot size (without the squared version), day of transaction, county dummies, and the principal characteristic (arable or grassland). We consider time as a continuous variable since we expected to have more precise matches with respect to the date of selling. That is, compared to the regression procedure we consider time differently (exact day of transaction versus annual dummy variables). To derive the ATET we use all observations; to derive the annual effects we implement the matching by year, that is, only the respective observations within a year are used.
The matched price for each forced-sales observation ( ) is given by .
The second variant uses the Mahalanobis metric with a kernel estimator, where all observations from the control group are considered, namely, = . The larger the Mahaln n c 0 anobis distance is, the lower is the respective weight of that observation. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) show that the kernel estimator is, in general, more efficient than k pairs matching; in our application, we use a Gaussian kernel function. It follows that
, where the weights are defined as = 0 p ) w j i j K , and denotes
the Gaussian kernel function (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 300). Additional calculations with other types of kernel functions showed that the results are not affected by the specification of the kernel type. is the bandh width parameter, and the results are robust with respect to the choice of the bandwidth parameter in the range from 0.8 up to 1.2; we opted for = 0.8. h Statistical inference is based on standard errors provided by Abadie and Imbens (2006) for both matching approaches. These approaches are based on an analytical estimator Note: Own calculations based on data from Obere Gutachterausschuss Brandenburg (2000 Brandenburg ( -2011 . The regression results are based on observations from the comparison group only, excluding pure grassland plots. Estimates for the regional dummy variables are not presented but are available upon request. **, *** Significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
of the asymptotic variance of the respective matching estimator. For the kernel matching, we also derive bootstrapped standard errors. 13 There is a direct relationship between the matching approach and the nonparametric regression (see Frölich 2005 for further details). The estimate of the counterfactual mean price can be expressed in terms of the conditional mean function of the outm( ⋅ ) come variable; based on a matching estimator as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) , it follows that = 0 E[p ⎪x,d
i i 1 , with being a non- (2005) notes, the various matching algorithms differ in how the conditional mean function is estimated using the data from the comparison group. Directly relating to the nonparameteric regression, the Nadayara-Watson estimator (also known as local constant regression) is directly comparable to a kernel-based matching estimator. 14
IV. RESULTS
We commence this section with a discussion of the regression results. The estimates for all -and -parameters, except the re-β γ gional county dummy variables, are provided in Table 2 . We used robust standard errors to account for possible heteroskedastic variances. The R-squared shows a rather high value of about 0.90. All quality and size variables are significant at the 1% level. As expected, the results reveal a positive impact of soil quality (positive linear term), but at a decreasing rate (negative quadratic term). The same is found for the lot size. The strong price increase in the second half of the last decade shown in Figure 1 is captured by significant year dummies from 2005 onward (with the exception of year 2006). 13 Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrap methods may fail to assess the variance of nearest-neighbor matching estimators.
14 Another alternative type of matching estimator is the local linear or local polynomial matching estimator as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) . As Frölich notes, these estimators are equivalent to the nonparametric regression estimators, namely, the local linear and local polynomial regressions, respectively (see also Smith 1999 or DiNardo and Tobias 2001) .
Based on these parameter estimates ( ) 0 β we predict the counterfactual price using the forced-sales observations ( ). In Table 3, 1 0
x β i the overall average and annual average predicted hypothetical prices, in column (5), and the average observed price in both groups, in columns (1) and (3), are presented. The price differences between the mean observed prices and the predicted hypothetical prices are shown in columns (3)- (5). The average price difference equals the average treatment effect on the treated, that is, . Over the en-ATET reg tire sample period the treatment effect is equal to €416/ha. According to a t-test it is not significant, but referring to Pearson's chi-square test it is significant at the 10% level. We further conduct a Chow test. The null hypothesis of no systematic differences by the treatment is rejected at the 1% level. The result needs to be interpreted with some care since the test is not robust against heteroskedasticity, and 
(3)- (5) (6) (3)-(6)
(3)- ( *, **, *** Significance based on standard errors by Abadie and Imbens (2006) at the 10% (p-value ≤ 0.10), 5% (p-value ≤ 0.05), and 1% (p-value ≤ 0.01) levels, respectively.
the type 1 error might actually be larger than the significance levels (cf. Greene 2012). Still, it gives indirect evidence that land put up for compulsory sale did not sell at a discount, but rather yielded a positive markup, on average. The treatment effects for each year are computed as annual averages using , where
and denotes the number of treated t . . . ,2011 n 1 observations in the respective year (cf. column (4) in Table 3 ). Apparently the effect of a foreclosure varies over years. The price differentials indicate that they switched signs during the 2000-2006 period, but during the period of the booming land market, that is, from 2007 onward, the effects are all positive. Based on a one-sample t-test and Pearson's chi-square test, we test whether the price difference is significantly different from zero. Referring to the t-test, the annual price differentials for 2006, 2007, and 2011 are found to be significantly different from zero at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. Referring to the chi-square test, in addition the price difference in 2008 is significant at the 10% level and in 2011 it is significant at the 5% level, respectively (cf. Table 3 ).
The matching results are illustrated in the remaining columns of Table 3 . The matched price using the Gaussian kernel function is shown in column (6), and the price differential "(3)-(6)" refers to the average treatment effect . Again we find a positive sig-ATET k − match nificant overall treatment effect of a foreclosure, which amounts to €378/ha. For the annual treatment effects we implement the matching for each year separately ( , with de-
noting the number of control observations in the respective year). Compared to the regression-based yearly effects, the kernel-matching-based treatment effects differ and show more years with a negative effect; however, the positive effect from 2007 onward is also found here. The significance levels are similar to the regression, except the effect for 2007. The annual treatment effect of the treated is significant only for 2006, 2008, and 2011 at the 10% level; however, the bootstrapped standard errors and the standard errors of Abadie and Imbens (2006) show different significance of the effects. The matched price using three nearestneighbor matching is shown in column (7), and the price difference corresponding to the average treatment effect on the treated is presented in the last column (3)-(7). In this case the equals €465/ha and is sig-ATET nn − match nificant at the 5% level. This figure is higher than the kernel-matching-based effect. This may be traced back to the different weighting schemes, since with the nearest-neighbor matching only three observations are considered to compute the matched price and not all observations as in the kernel-based matching. Compared to the regression-prediction-based effect, the nearest-neighbor-matched ATET and the kernel-matched ATET are both considerably lower.
The annual effects are calculated just as the kernel-based matching effects are: by implementing the matching procedure for each year separately. It is interesting that more annual effects are significant with higher significance levels compared to the kernel-based-matching results. Compared to the yearly kernel-basedmatching results, the number of negative effects is lower; however, a trend with positive effects from 2007 onward is also revealed.
Interestingly, the treatment effects on the treated according to all estimation procedures are significant during times of recessive land market conditions (2006) where the pressure effect dominates, which is also found in the regression-based ATET. The treatment effect is also significant during times of booming conditions (2008 and 2011) where the auction effect outweighs the pressured sale effect. This result is in line with earlier empirical findings reported in the auction and real estate literature (e.g., Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2011).
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
By contrasting land prices realized in foreclosures with prices from regular land sales, we found that forced sales did not sell at a discount, on average. On the contrary, according to the most conservative estimate prices, quotes in forced sales were about €300/ha higher than prices in nonforced sales in Bran-denburg during the last decade. This corresponds to a price increase of about 10%, which contradicts the common expectation of price-shaving within a foreclosure. This finding implies that lenders (banks) can expect the revenues from a foreclosure to be higher compared to selling the land through private negotiations. Taken as a whole, this finding is not contradictory to pricing theory. Two opposite effects interact in the price formation of foreclosures, namely, the (negative) liquidity effect of a forced sale due to time pressure and a variety of other regulatory constraints on the one hand, and the (positive) effect of auctions on the other hand. Our results reveal that the latter effect outweighs the former in Brandenburg's land market, on average. Another interesting finding is that the price premium related to foreclosures is not constant over time. We rather observe substantially higher price premiums per hectare since 2007, that is, since the beginning of the price boom in land markets in Germany's new federal states.
What can we conclude from these outcomes regarding our initial research question, the appraisal of mortgage lending values? In view of the documented price premium of foreclosures, it is tempting to conclude that no price-shaving from regular sale values is necessary at all. This ignores, however, the variability of the price differential between forced and nonforced sales, as well as the variability in the level of land prices. In 2001, for example, land put up for compulsory sale sold at a discount of approximately 50% compared with regular land market transactions. That means if the mortgage lending value of land in 2000 was fixed at the current sales price (i.e., €2,400/ha on average) creditors would have suffered a considerable loss in the event of a debt default in 2001. This situation is the worst case that occurred in the observation period, but extremely risk-averse debtors may consider it relevant. As a general rule, one can state that price-shaving mortgage lending values should be more pronounced in a downturn market for two reasons: first, the expected price level is likely to decrease, and second, the price difference between foreclosure prices and normal sales prices may become negative. Moreover, one can conclude that a constant discount on a current land price is usually not appropriate. One should rather adapt the mortgage lending value to the expected conditions of the land market in the considered credit period.
Nevertheless, these findings must be interpreted considering the limitations of the matching procedure. Even though matching is a popular method for evaluating many types of effects, it remains a controversial issue in the evaluation literature. While matching does not rely on functional form assumptions or the exogeneity of the regressors, it does require that the valid conditioning set is known such that the CIA holds. As Heckman and NavarroLozano (2004) further point out, there is no guidance for the choice of variables upon which the matching relies; this may have an impact on the statistical inference. Our regression-based approach relies on a functional form but explicitly takes into account that the slope coefficients are affected by the treatment; however, this advantage may in turn be a shortcoming, because due to omitted variables and neglected spatial correlation or effects, the estimates may be biased and the price function might be incorrect. It is further assumed that the price formation processes are independent of each other; however, this might not hold given the spatial asset fixity of land. Further, the reasons for being in the forced-sales group cannot be assumed to be fully independent of the price formation process in local markets. The interaction between the farms in local markets and other competitive issues may affect both the local price for land and the reasons for insolvency. This, however, seems to have an impact on the estimation of the treatment effect. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) indicate the necessity of considering the economic reasoning behind the treatment, and to account in an econometric sense for the endogenous treatment variable. Since the available dataset permitted us to consider more sophisticated econometric models and evaluation methods, our findings can be interpreted as a first indication of price differences in a forced-sales auction procedure. Accounting for global and local land market conditions, as well as modeling the treatment effect with more structure can be considered promising avenues for fu-ture work, which must also disentangle the effects of public auctions and forced sales through public auctions.
